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Willard Hurst and the Administrative State: 
From Williams to Wisconsin 
DANIEL R. ERNST 
Perhaps because Willard Hurst did not publish his first book, The Growth 
of American Law, until 1950, more than a decade after he entered law teach-
ing, his readers have often found it hard to imagine him as other than a fully 
formed scholar. The pluralist politics of his major writings, their function-
alist sociology, and their attentiveness to consensus in history have made 
Hurst seem so much a product of the 1950s that one can easily overlook 
the ways in which developments in law and politics in the preceding de-
cades shaped his perspective on the American past. 1 
No development more engaged Hurst than "the overshadowing rise of 
the administrative process" since the Civil War. Without neglecting the con-
tinuing role of the judiciary in American governance, Hurst wanted to create 
a legal curriculum and jurisprudence to supplant the court-centered para-
digms of his day. The curricular innovation came first, in the form of the 
1. James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1950). 
Daniel R. Ernst is a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center. He 
thanks Robert W. Gordon, Laura Kalman, Alfred S. Konefsky, Stanley Kutler, 
Charles W. McCurdy, Clyde Spillenger, Christopher L. Tomlins, Mark V. Tushnet, 
Victoria Saker Woeste, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on drafts 
of this article; participants of seminars at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law 
School and the American Bar Foundation for their remarks on this article or relat-
ed work; Clark Byse, Frances W. Hurst, Stanley I. Kutler, Charles F. Luce, and 
Willard Wirtz for their recollections of Willard Hurst; the archivists Monica Blank, 
Sylvia Kennick Brown, Cathy Jacob, Harold L. Miller, Lori Olson, Jeffrey 
Suchanek, and David Warrington for their assistance in making available documents 
in their collections; Mr. Hugo L. Black, Jr., for permission to examine the papers 
of Justice Black; and Thomas Andrews, Mary Calkins, Patrick J. McClain, and 
Jessica Schneider for their research assistance. 
Law and History Review Spring 2000, Vol. 18, No.1 
© 2000 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois 
HeinOnline -- 18 Law & Hist. Rev. 2 2000
2 Law and History Review, Spring 2000 
"Law in Society" materials that Hurst, with the collaboration of his dean, 
Lloyd K. Garrison, developed at the University of Wisconsin Law School 
in the 1930s. The statement of a jurisprudence to replace judicial norms 
of due process, formal styles of legal reasoning, and a notion of the Rule 
of Law premised on judicial review under written constitutions was hard-
er work. Not until Hurst published his great legal history of Wisconsin's 
lumber industry, Law and Economic Growth, in 1964 did he feel that he 
had finally practiced what Roscoe Pound had only preached by articulat-
ing a "sociological jurisprudence" based on the ideal of law as a function-
al means to "a socially acceptable end."2 
This article follows Hurst from his undergraduate days at Williams Col-
lege through the start of his teaching career at Wisconsin in the fall of 1937. 
During these years Hurst acquired an abiding interest in the rise of the 
administrative state as well as some of the insights he would use to account 
for it in his mature work. For the most part, the article proceeds chrono-
logically through four episodes in Hurst's training: (1) his year-long study 
of Charles and Mary Beard's Rise of American Civilization undertaken as 
an undergraduate at Williams College; (2) his three years as a student at 
the Harvard Law School; (3) his research fellowship with Felix Frankfurt-
er during the 1935-36 academic year; and (4) his service as legal secre-
tary to Louis D. Brandeis during the October 1936 Term of the U.S. Su-
preme Court. The first and third episodes inclined Hurst to see history less 
as an aid to the judicial interpretation of precedents, statutes, and consti-
tutions than as a way to divine where the state should strike the "balance 
of power" in regulating the American economy and society. The second and 
fourth episodes show that Hurst embraced the Legal Realists' skepticism 
toward judge-made law, but also went beyond them to address that "large 
field of present human activity ... governed not alone by court decisions 
and statutes, but by administrative regulations and decisions." More enthu-
siastically than his mentors Frankfurter and Brandeis, Hurst accepted the 
growth of unreviewable discretion by administrators, and he was quicker 
to accord "the regulations, rulings and decisions of administrative agen-
cies" the same status as judge-made law. 3 
2. Willard Hurst, "Who Is the 'Great' Appellate Judge?" Indiana Law Journal 24 (1949): 
396; James Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber 
Industry ill Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964); 
Willard Hurst, "J. Willard Hurst: An Interview Conducted by Laura L. Smail" (Madison: 
University Archives Oral History Project, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1981),25 (here-
after Hurst. Smail Interview); James Willard Hurst, "Legal Elements in United States His-
tory," Per.lpectives ill American History 5 (1971): 3. 
3. "Administrative Law," Curriculum Committee Report No.8, 1947, Box 5, Series 11111 
2, University of Wisconsin Archives, Memorial Library, Madison (hereafter Subject Files, 
WLS-UWA). 
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Each of the four episodes contributed something to Hurst's mature un-
derstanding of the Rule of Law in the new American state, but their les-
sons did not add up to a complete answer. His experiences of the late 1930s 
and 1940s taught him new lessons and gave him cause to discard or rework 
what he had already learned. A complete account of the origins of Hurst's 
mature work would have to address his activities as a law professor before 
Pearl Harbor, his service in Washington's wartime bureaucracies, and his 
period of study under a Demobilization Grant of the Social Science Re-
search Counci1.4 Even so, a study of Hurst's education and apprenticeships 
is enough to suggest how much his social history of American law owed 
to the political history of his young adulthood. 
Conflict and Consensus in American History 
Particularly because much of the functionalist social science of the 1950s 
had a teleological cast and treated such phenomena as the rise of the ad-
ministrative state as inevitable or necessary, one should remember that 
Willard Hurst, born on October 6, 1910, came of age during the Great 
Depression, when the American economy self-evidently was not function-
ing and when the ultimate success of new experiments in administration 
was very much in doubt. That society functioned as well as it did was al-
ways cause for amazement for Hurst, little short of a "miracle," as James 
Gould Cozzens, one of his favorite novelists, put it, the performance of a 
seemingly impossible feat of social organization "every day, come hell, 
come high water."5 The critic Elizabeth Janeway once wrote that the he-
roes of Cozzens's novels were men who understand "the way things 
worked, the functioning of the world." They live with these functions, "in-
terpret them for others and in some part keep the machinery running. Able, 
responsible men, more burdened by duty than eager for power, learning in 
maturity that one never really knows enough, stoically bearing the weight 
of the world-these are the men Cozzens sets up as admirable." Hurst 
4. Hurst's year at the Board of Economic Warfare is the subject of my forthcoming arti-
cle, "The Ideal and the Actual in the State: Willard Hurst at the Board of Economic War-
fare," in Total War and the Law: New Perspectives on World War II, ed. Daniel R. Ernst and 
Victor Jew (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2000). 
5. James Gould Cozzens, The Just and the Unjust (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942),434. 
Hurst called The Just and the Unjust and Cozzens's Guard of Honor (1948) "the best fiction 
anyone has done about the law in this country." Hurst to Frankfurter, 12 January 1949, reel 
42, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress (hereafter FF-LC). Frances Hurst and 
Stanley Kutler have assured me that Cozzens and John P. Marquand were among Hurst's 
favorite authors. Frances Hurst, interviewed by author, Madison, Wis., 12 May 1998; Stan-
ley Kutler, conversation with author, Madison, Wis., 13 May 1998. 
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agreed that Cozzens's heroes were admirable, and, like Cozzens himself, 
he assigned to lawyers "a key administrative role in making this complex, 
division-of-Iabor-society operate from day to day."6 
As far as we know, Hurst first started thinking seriously about the rela-
tion of law to "historical and economic currents" while a student at Wil-
liams College, which he attended from 1928 to 1932. Born and raised in 
Rockford, Illinois, where his father had been the superintendent of a pi-
ano factory and the co-owner of most of the town's movie theaters, Hurst 
settled on Williams out of what he later termed "a rather romantic attach-
ment to the idea of going to college in New England." He recalled, "It in 
some ways was a rather rough atmosphere to come into for a young fel-
low from a Midwest high school, because Williams was at that point still 
much dominated by a student-body drawn from Eastern prep schools who 
set the whole social tone and pretty much ran the politics of the place." He 
never joined a fraternity, but concentrated his energy on his studies, at 
which he excelled; on the student newspaper, where he was editor in chief; 
and on the International Affairs Club, which he served as secretary and 
president. An economics major who published a prize-winning essay on 
the Low Countries' response to the English Gold Crisis of 1931, Hurst took 
almost as many courses in history, and he became captivated by the per-
spective the past provided on the relationship between the economy and 
governmental processes.7 
The principal focus for Hurst's thinking on this subject was a senior hon-
ors tutorial, directed by the historian Theodore Clarke Smith during the 
1931-32 academic year, in which he and Smith argued about Charles and 
Mary Beard's recently published Rise of American Civilization. Hurst read 
the book enthusiastically and thought it represented "the whole new light 
of history." Smith thought it "phony and pretentious." Judging from the 
broadside Smith fired at Charles Beard several years later in the Ameri-
can Historical Review, he would have told Hurst that Beard's "economic 
theory of history" rendered him incapable of pursuing Ranke's "noble 
dream" of historical impartiality. Beard believed that "the only valid his-
tory was that which traced the forward movement of society toward a 
collectivist democracy," Smith insisted. By making history the servant of 
6. Elizabeth Janeway, review of The Novels of James Gould Cozzens, by Frederick Bracher, 
New York Times Book Review, 9 August 1959, I; Willard Hurst, "Lawyers in American So-
ciety, 1750-1966," Marquette Law Review 50 (1967): 600. 
7. Hurst, Smail Interview, 1-2, 18; Williams College, GlIlielmensian (1932), 69; "Belgium, 
Holland, and Switzerland and the English Gold Crisis of 1931," 23 April 1932, Archives and 
Special Collections, Williams College Library; Willard Hurst, "Holland, Switzerland, and 
Belgium and the English Gold Crisis of 1931," Journal of Political Ecrnomy 40 (1932): 638-
60. 
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Fig.!. James Willard Hurst, Williams College Gulielmensian, 1933. Courtesy of Wi 1-
Iiams College Archives and Special Collections. 
politics, Beard was traveling down a path blazed by Soviet, Fascist, and 
Nazi historians.s 
Hurst was never fully persuaded by Smith. In the ] 950s he listed Charles 
Beard's Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States 
as one of the books "any lawyer whose interest in his profession reaches 
beyond technical craftsmanship" should read. 9 Moreover, Hurst often in-
voked the Beards' view of the Civil War as a Second American Revolu-
tion to justify his slighting of colonial America. Thus, in 1952 he urged 
upon Frankfurter "Charles Beard's thesis" that "the United States had a 
8. Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," Law and History Review 12 (1994): 371; Theodore Clarke 
Smith, 'The Writing of American History in America, from 1884 to 1934," American His-
torical Review 40 (1935): 447-49. Hurst retained his heavily annotated copy of Rise of 
American Civilization throughout his life, and it has b(;come something of an heirloom in 
his family. Frances Hurst, interview. 
9. "Social Science on a Lawyer's Bookshelf," n.d., in Frankfurter to Hurst, lO May 1956, 
reel 42, FF-LC. 
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second birth in the 1870's," which made the late nineteenth-century law-
makers as much a founding generation as the Framers. Hurst might trace 
"middle class values" back to the English Civil War, but he had little use 
for colonial American legal history, and he dismissed eighteenth-century 
Anglo-American law as too riven with corruption and incompetence to be 
worth studying. His interest picked up once he detected the social forces 
he associated with modernization, such as "the rise of large scale industry 
and finance, the flow of immigration, urbanization, the fixing of the mod-
em character of major political parties, [and] the rise of new style 10bbies."lo 
The Beards' project of creating a usable past for a modernizing society, 
then, inspired Hurst to take a presentist approach to the past. He could make 
his history the servant of his jurisprudence and not feel the qualms that a 
scholar with other historical heroes might have felt. I I 
Well before the 1950s, however, Hurst grew dissatisfied with a Beard-
ian approach to the past as little more than the clash of conflicting inter-
ests. Consequently, he looked to consensual theories of social function to 
supplement the Progressive historian's tales of social conflict. At times he 
spoke of Charles Beard almost as a youthful enthusiasm. 
In his second year of law teaching, for example, Hurst told Frankfurter 
of a seminar on the history of the Supreme Court he was planning with Wil-
liam Hesseltine, perhaps the most passionate Progressive in Wisconsin's 
Beardian history department. Hesseltine was "a good man by all accounts," 
Hurst explained, "also somewhat of a left-winger. His approach of course 
has been of the Beard variety: economic interpretation largely, with con-
centration on the major and more spectacular cases." Hurst hoped to "tackle 
something less obvious than the usual big cases and derive some light there-
from either as to American growth generally, or at least to" the develop-
ment of the Court. Changes in diversity jurisdiction in the antebellum pe-
riod, for example, might offer "a slant on the business of making federalism 
work" or on the growth of national commerce. 12 
In 1939 Hurst reviewed several works that took issue with the Beards' 
claim in Rise of American Civilization that the drafters of the Fourteenth 
Amendment intended its guarantee of equal protection and due process to 
10. Hurst to Frankfurter, 27 July 1952, reel 42, FF-LC; J. Willard Hurst, "Modern Amer-
ican Legal History" (Madison: Wisconsin Public Radio, 1978), cassette I, side I. 
II. See Stanley N. Katz, "The Problem of a Colonial Legal History," in Colonial British 
America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era, ed. Jack P. Greene and 1. R. 
Pole (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984),465-66. 
12. Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American His-
torical Profession (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 345; Hurst to Frankfurt-
er, 27 February 1938, Box 192, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School Library (here-
after FF-HLS). 
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"persons" to be the vehicle for smuggling rights for corporations into the 
Constitution. A more defensible position, Hurst implied with an approv-
ing quote of Howard Jay Graham, was that the doctrine that corporations 
were persons was "so vital and natural a part of the self-expansion of ju-
dicial power within the framework of due process, that its postwar devel-
opment was assured, whatever may have been the original objectives of the 
framers." 13 
By the early 1940s, Hurst was quite ready to move beyond interest as a 
historical cause, but when the war came he had only begun to envision how 
social process and function might serve as alternatives. Pendleton Herring's 
pluralist account of the American polity, The Politics of Democracy, which 
Hurst reviewed in 1941, came as a revelation. Herring argued that inter-
est-group politics was a remarkable achievement, the peaceful adjustment 
of social conflict. "This emphasis may seem nothing novel to men of an 
older teaching," Hurst wrote, perhaps with Smith in mind, "but it may cause 
some revision of values among readers of my college generation, taught 
to regard the political historian as one naively skirting the realities dealt 
with by the students of economic and social trends."14 Hurst would not read 
systematically in the works of anthropology, sociology, and social psychol-
ogy and fashion an alternative to Beard until his Demobilization Grant. At 
that point Richard Hofstadter, another borrower from sociology and psy-
chology, would surpass Beard in his pantheon of historians. 15 
Outgrowing the Harvard Law School: 
Legal Realism and the Administrative Process 
Hurst seriously considered pursuing a graduate degree in economics, but 
he ultimately decided that he wanted to learn about the law from the stand-
point of legal insiders, the lawyers themselves. "The logical place to go, 
especially for anybody who'd been four years in Williamstown," Hurst 
recalled, "seemed to be the Harvard Law School," and so he went. When 
he entered the school, Hurst had not yet decided how he would use his legal 
education. While he did want to "become a good lawyer," he did not nec-
13. Willard Hurst, review of Truth al1d Fictiol1 about the Fourteenth Amel1dmel1t, by Louis 
B. Boudin, Harvard Law Review 52 (1939): 851, 858. 
14. Willard Hurst, review of The Politics of Democracy, by Pendleton Herring, Harvard 
Law Review 54 (1941): 715, 717. 
15. Hurst recommended Hofstadter's Americal1 Political Traditiol1 and Social Darwinism 
il1 America to Frankfurter and placed both books and The Age of Reform on his list of rec-
ommended readings for the Wisconsin bar in 1956. Hurst to Frankfurter, 12 January 1949, 
reel 42, FF-LC; "Social Science on a Lawyer's Bookshelf," n.d., ibid. 
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essarily expect to become a practitioner, and he soon set his sights on a 
career as a legal academic. '6 
For this scholarly, thoughtful, and capable student, the case method of 
Harvard's first-year curriculum was a disappointment, an "unimaginative 
brand of good, solid tradesmen's education."'? In part, he missed the close 
relationship he had had with his teachers at Williams. Harvard was "a very 
cold, impersonal place," he recalled. The faculty was "quite remote." Those 
who labored on the Restatement projects, he told Brandeis, sat "in Langdell 
Hall and gloat[ed] over citations of themselves with a miser's pleasure."'8 
The alienation was only partially alleviated by Hurst's success on his ex-
aminations and his growing sense of accomplishment and ability. "You sort 
of figured that at the end of your first year at the Harvard Law School if 
you could survive and make it there you could probably survive and make 
it any place," he remembered. 19 
Hurst's dissatisfaction was compounded by Harvard's pedagogy. As 
practiced by such master Langdellians as Samuel WiIliston, who taught him 
contracts, the case method struck Hurst as willfully blind to the most ex-
citing and novel aspects of law in the Depression era, as well as the eco-
nomic and political dimension of judicial decision making that the Beards 
memorably explored in the Rise of American Civilization. The relentless 
study of cases and courts provided almost no opportunity to explore legis-
lation and administration. (Hurst would have to wait until his year as Frank-
furter's research assistant before he could attend a course on legislation.) 
Moreover, his instructors analyzed case law as a matter of legal logic, "an 
exercise in Euclid's geometry." That Williston, a sophisticated man of busi-
ness, taught the law as if it were "a separate and distinct piece of reality" 
remained a mystery to him.20 
The Lessons of Legal Realism 
As an antidote to the case method, Hurst prescribed for himself a course 
of reading in the work of Karl Llewellyn and other Legal Realists. In 
16. Hurst, Smail Interview, 2-3; Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," 373. 
17. Hurst to Lloyd K. Garrison, 3 June 1946, Box 5. Lloyd K. Garrison Papers, Harvard 
Law School Library. 
18. Hurst, Smail Interview, 3-4; "No. 17, Mechanics Universal Joint Co. v. Culhane, Re. 
draft of opinion," n.d., 19, reel 26, series 2, Louis Dembitz Brandeis Papers, Harvard Law 
School Library (hereafter LDB-HLS). The particular Restater Hurst had in mind might have 
been Warren Seavey, as Culhane involved the law of agency and one of the notes Hurst edited 
for the Harvard Law Review referred extensively to Seavey's restatement of that field of law. 
"Liability of Directors and Other Agents for Procuring Breach of Corporate Contract," 
Harvard Law Review 48 (1934): 298-302. 
19. Hurst, Smail Interview, 3. 
20. Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," 377, 372-73. 
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Llewellyn's writings on the law of sales Hurst found the exciting story of 
the interplay between law and economic forces that was so exasperatingly 
absent in Williston's contracts course. Llewellyn conveyed the notion that 
"the law of sales had something to do with the wayan American economy 
worked and developed." And that "something" was thought of in functional 
terms, as a contribution to the proper working of particular societies in 
distinct times and places. The functional approach to law would be for Hurst 
the most important contribution of Legal Realism. "A realistic history of 
law in the United States," he later wrote, "will be a social history of law, 
taking law as man-made, and as the product of both deliberation and drift, 
but not of any immanent superior order of reality."21 
The social origins of law and the implication for the common law of 
contract, tort, and property were recurrent themes in Hurst's mature work. 
At the most fundamental level, Hurst attacked the notion of individuals as 
independent bearers of natural rights that constrained the public realm of 
policy-making, arguing instead that "men realize their humanity only in a 
social context." He paused to make this point during his legal history lec-
tures with a blast at the Gilded Age's worship of "what was called 'the self-
made man.'" It was "certainly one of the most vain characterizations of 
human nature anybody ever succeeded in inventing," he snorted. "As if any 
individual could be 'self-made"'-as if any individual did not owe "the 
society into which he is born" an enormous debt for "an immense heritage" 
in the form of language and accumulated social knowledge "for which he 
hadn't paid a cent."22 
Such views informed Hurst's understanding of the "regulatory implica-
tions" of the consideration doctrine and other aspects of contracts law. 
"Insofar as the law undertakes to enforce private agreements," he explained 
to his students, "to that degree it is in effect delegating the power of the 
state to those people who want to enforce their contracts, and to that ex-
tent the state is sanctioning what these contracting parties want to bring 
about." And if private rights were in fact publicly created, judges could not 
pretend that they were simply deferring to a distinct realm of natural jus-
tice in deciding whether to enforce a contract. Had the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided to enforce a racially restrictive covenant in Barrows v. Jackson, 
21. James Willard Hurst, "Legal Elements," 28. For Llewellyn's influence on Hurst, see 
Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," 372-73, 381; Aviam Soifer, "In Retrospect: Willard Hurst, 
Consensus History, and The Growth of American Law," Reviews in American History 20 
(1992): 141, n. 14. And on the functionalism of Llewellyn and other Legal Realists, see Laura 
Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1986), 3-44; N. E. H. Hull, Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn: Searching for an American 
Jurisprudence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 136-47. 
22. Hurst, "Legal Elements," 84; Hurst, "Modem American Legal History," cassette 17, 
side 2. 
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Hurst argued, it would of course have been acting on its own authority to 
see to it that the public power was used responsibly. It had also acted on 
the same mandate when it refused to enforce the covenant in that case.23 
An opportunity to demonstrate his grasp of what Hurst considered the 
"basic" insight of Legal Realism came during his term as Brandeis's legal 
secretary in a case involving picketing by trade unionists. Senn v. Tile Lay-
ers Protective Union was a constitutional challenge to a Wisconsin statute 
that forbade courts from prohibiting peaceful picketing. It was brought by 
a nonunion contractor who employed one or two workers but also labored 
on his jobs himself. Senn argued that by forbidding courts from issuing in-
junctions against strikes on his jobs Wisconsin was failing in its duty to 
protect his "inalienable right" to "work in his own business with his own 
hands." The statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due 
process, he insisted, and was void.24 
Brandeis's draft opinion attempted to parry Senn's argument by distin-
guishing between an act of the state, for which a Fourteenth Amendment 
claim could be made, and an omission to act, for which the requisite "state 
action" was missing. In effect, Brandeis argued that the state of Wiscon-
sin had not inflicted economic loss on the contractor; the trade unionists 
had. Much like the Legal Realist Walter Wheeler Cook, Hurst objected that 
Brandeis's resort to the act-omission distinction ducked the difficult issue 
of whether the state should recognize and confirm the defendant's power 
to inflict economic loss on the plaintiff. "True, the State does not by affir-
mative fiat take away plaintiff's right to work himself," Hurst told Bran-
deis, "but what of the practical effect of leaving the unions free to exert 
strong pressure to the same end?" Brandeis's opinion should acknowledge 
that the Court was "in the realm of choice," Hurst advised. The "State's 
decision to leave one property owner in 'freedom' may inescapably mean 
a decision to impose restrictions upon the 'freedom' of another."25 
Hurst's belief in the public origins of private rights had far-reaching im-
plications. It suggested that the rights of interest groups and other collec-
23. Hurst, "Modern American Legal History," cassette 31, side 2; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 
U.S. 249 (1953). 
24. Hurst, "Modern American Legal History," cassette 31, side 2; Senn v. Tile Layers 
Protective Union, 30 I U.S. 468 (1937). 
25. "No. 658, Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1936), Re. draft of 
opinion," 19 April 1937, 20-21, reel 26, LDB-HLS. Hurst supported his argument with a 
citation to Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928), in which Justice Harlan Fiske Stone 
explained the decision to uphold a statute authorizing the destruction of cedar trees for the 
benefit of apple growers with the remark that "it would have been none the less a choice" 
had the state decided not to enact the statute. For Cook on Brandeis's resort to the act-omis-
sion distinction in Internatiollal News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 260-61 
(1918), see "The Associated Press Case," Yale Law Journal 28 (1919): 387-91. 
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tive actors were also the products of a prior collective choice. As Hurst lat-
er wrote, incorporation statutes, public subsidies, the opening of national 
markets, and "the freedom which law gave for association" created an as-
tounding array of interest groups to which politically organized Americans 
readily deferred throughout the nineteenth century, rather than claim "the 
planning of social policy" for themselves. Laissez-faire was not a natural 
condition; the real meaning of this "myth" was "our deep adherence to the 
institution of the market as the device to determine where economic deci-
sion-making should rest." The establishment of public utility commissions, 
the revitalization of antitrust law, and a host of other systems of inspection, 
licensure, and regulation were not novel intrusions into the private realm, 
but a reassertion of the public's preexisting right to strike "the balance of 
power" among state-created entities by intervening at "key points in social 
organization." The fundamental question, Hurst would argue to Mark De-
Wolfe Howe in 1949, was "Who Runs the Show"? "Control of the econo-
my" had been entrusted at various times to various groups, including "la-
bor union heads and corporation bureaucrats and government bureaucrats." 
Those who run "the show without having taken an official oath of office and 
those who run at least part of the show on the basis that they have taken an 
oath of office" were equally accountable for their use of public power. 26 
The case method depicted law as an apolitical process of deduction from 
abstract principles arrived at through induction from decided cases. Hurst 
found an alternative to this in the Legal Realists. Yet their functional ap-
proach to law provided at best only a point of departure for understanding 
the command-and-control regulation, licensure and inspection, taxation, 
social insurance, social provision and other forms of administrative action 
that burgeoned in the twentieth century. The Legal Realists, Hurst later 
explained, made "only a limited" break with the Langdellian curriculum. 
For the most part, they were interested in "the courts, and in a more real-
istic understanding of what moves judges to decide the way they do." Hurst 
was convinced, as he later put it, that "statutes and administrative rules and 
precedents" provided "principled or predictable lines of public policy," and 
not simply "arbitrary exercises of will." But where, at the Harvard Law 
School, might he find help in understanding the actions of those who "ran 
the show" within the state but outside the courtS?27 
26. Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956),82,84,85,89; James Willard Hurst, "Law 
and the Balance of Power in the Community," Record of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York 6 (1951): ISS; Hurst to Mark DeWolfe Howe, 22 June 1949, Box 3, Mark 
DeWolfe Howe Papers, Harvard Law School Library. 
27. Hurst, Smail Interview, 19; James Willard Hurst, "Old and New Dimensions of Re-
search in United States Legal History," American Journal of Legal History 23 (1979): 3. Like 
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The Frankfurterian Beacon 
The most promising candidate was Felix Frankfurter, who had made the 
teaching of legislation and administrative law his specialty since joining 
the faculty in 1914. Hurst encountered Frankfurter in his course on the 
Interstate Commerce Act, worked with him closely while editing several 
student notes on administrative law during the 1934-35 academic year, and 
audited his graduate course on administrative law during his year as Frank-
furter's research assistant. He read Frankfurter's influential statement on 
the place of law in the administrative state, The Public and Its Government 
(1930), no later than his third year of law school, when he edited a note 
citing the book.28 
Frankfurter's acceptance of the rise of administration made him a bea-
con for Hurst. The growth of administrative government, Frankfurter in-
sisted, was no perversion of the timeless constitutional principle of sepa-
ration of powers but "the inevitable response of government to the needs 
of modern society." Frankfurter conceived of those needs as vast, material 
forces, such as "technology, large-scale industry, and progressive urban-
ization."29 His casebooks provided an expansive view of administration, 
ranging from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to workers' com-
pensation commissions to a host of state-level systems of "licenses, certifi-
cates, permits, orders, awards, and what not." So variegated a development 
could not have been the product of a particular political philosophy or act 
of "far-sighted planning," Frankfurter maintained. Rather, it resulted from 
the "pressure of circumstances."3o 
Hurst, Neil Duxbury has stressed the limits of the Legal Realists' contribution to the New 
Deal state, in his Patterns of American Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 149-58. 
28. Hurst, Smail Interview, 10; Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," 373; Hurst to Frankfurter, 2 
June 1954, reel 42, FF-LC; Felix Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1930); "The Chicago Telephone Case: A New Technique in Rate 
Review," Harvard Law Review 48 (1934): 83, n. 2. In 1981, Hurst explained that he had 
"some connection with" Frankfurter "growing out of my law review editor's work .... 
[T]here was always consultation with relevant faculty members on whatever the subject 
matter made appropriate, and in the normal course of dealing ... I got to know various fac-
ulty members in a way I never would have just as another student at the school." Hurst, Smail 
Interview, 8. 
29. These quotations are from Felix Frankfurter, "The Task of Administrative Law," Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review 75 (1927): 617, and a subsequently published and slightly 
revised version of the same essay, Preface to the First Edition (1932), in Felix Frankfurter 
and J. Forrester Davison, Cases and Materials on Administrative Law (Chicago: Founda-
tion Press, 1935), v. 
30. Frankfurter and Davison, Administrative Law. 570-74; Frankfurter, Public and Its 
Government. 29, 133. 
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According to Frankfurter, the complexity of the problems of modernity 
would frustrate any technocratic solution offered by experts wielding an 
"irrefragable fund of knowledge." The American people were not up to the 
job, either. They were too "hurried," too "hostile to reflection," and more 
interested in scandal than "a knowledge of the good in government." Pol-
iticians could only see government as a source of patronage; they were 
responsible for the appointment of "mediocre lawyers" to administrative 
bodies, who fell far short of Frankfurter's ideal bureaucrats, the members 
of the British civil service.3l 
The challenge for American educators, Frankfurter wrote, was to pro-
duce administrators with the proper "intellectual procedure and ... tem-
per of mind," a procedure and temper that bore a remarkable resemblance 
to the qualities that Roscoe Pound believed the common law tradition im-
parted to American lawyers. The best administrators, snch as the ICC's 
Joseph B. Eastman, were "fortified" by their technicians but not over-
whelmed by them. They independently performed the "quiet, detached, 
laborious task of disentangling facts from fiction, of extracting reliable 
information from interested parties, of agreeing upon what is proof and 
what surmise." They were as independent of "the actual or supposed wishes 
or needs even of the President as is the Supreme Court of the United States." 
(On the other hand, they were responsive to the "constant play of criticism 
by an informed and spirited bar.") If the administrators did all this, then 
they would enjoy "an esteem in the public such as the public now enter-
tains for the judiciary," if only because they were scarcely distinguishable 
from judges, as Frankfurter idealized them.32 
Hurst followed Frankfurter in seeing administrative action, such as Wis-
consin's system of worker's compensation, in functional telms, as a response 
to "the force of facts." He agreed that the American public was not up to the 
job of governance, especially when the return of prosperity after World War 
II distracted them with consumer goods. Legislative oversight might help 
"headline-hunting legislators," but it unhelpfully made "lower-echelon ex-
ecutive officers" fear for their jobs and reputation. Party regulars were al-
ways quick to see a burgeoning state as an expansion of "one of the most 
concrete and tangible fighting grounds of government, namely, jobs."33 
31. Frankfurter, Public and Its Government, 151,127-28,133,114,146. 
32. Ibid., 133, 135, 122, 151, 127, 153, 163; Frankfurter, "Task of Administrative Law," 
618; see Roscoe Pound, "The Administrative Application of Legal Standards," Reports of 
the American Bar Association 44 (1919): 464-65. 
33. Willard Hurst, "The Uses of Law in Four 'Colonial' States of the American Union," 
Wisconsin Law Review 1945: 577; Hurst, Growth of American Law, 435-36,441,443; Hurst 
to Raoul Berger, 18 November \963, Box I, Raoul Berger Papers, Harvard Law School 
Library; "Symposium on Lawyers under the United States Civil Service," American Law 
School Review 9 (1942): 1316. 
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Hurst also agreed with Frankfurter that "the expert should be on tap, but 
not on top"-unless that expert was a lawyer. 34 Frankfurter's notion of 
proper training may have been more lawyerly in its emphasis on reason, 
and Hurst's more social scientific in its emphasis on social function, but 
both believed that lawyers were peculiarly suited to seeing the complex 
whole that specialists missed. "The lawyer is the expert whose skill it is 
to make social use of the experts in all other fields," Hurst wrote in 1942. 
The very nature of the legal profession-"the peaceful adjustment of 
conflict and the co-ordination and planning of men's interrelated activi-
ties"-made lawyers "jacks-of-all-trades."35 Together with their knowledge 
of "problems of power," this eclectic outlook permitted them to "mould the 
social environment into a decent, viable balance of power for the greater 
liberty of private individuals and groupS."36 
Yet, if Hurst looked to Frankfurter for guidance in understanding the 
administrative process in its own right, he must have been disappointed. 
True, Frankfurter praised the Commonwealth Fund's investigations of the 
internal working of administrative agencies during the 1920s and 1930s. 
"Only a physiological study of administrative law in action will disclose 
the processes, the practices, the determining factors of administrative de-
cisions, and illumine the relation between commissions and courts, now 
left obscure by the printed pages of court opinions," he wrote in the pref-
ace to one of them. For lawyers, however, the chief utility of such projects 
was the insight they provided into the task of tailoring standards of judi-
cial review to the "history, structure and enveloping environment" of a 
particular agency. Here and whenever Frankfurter identified "the concern 
of Administrative Law" as a field, he settled not on what administrative 
agencies did, but on how "the traditional system of Anglo-American law 
and courts" disposed of the jurisdictional and constitutional issues admin-
istrative action raised. 37 
34. Frankfurter, Public and Its Government, 161. 
35. Willard Hurst, "Legal History: A Research Program," Wisconsin Law Review 1942: 323. 
36. Hurst to Mark DeWolfe Howe, 22 June 1949, Box 3, Howe Papers; Hurst, Law and 
the Conditions of Freedom, 42-43. 
37. Frankfurter, "Task of Administrative Law," 620, 619; Frankfurter and Davison, Ad-
ministrative Law, vi, v. In considering Frankfurter a key figure in the development of an 
administrative law that had "nothing to do with the substance of administrative decisions," 
I am following William C. Chase, The American Law School and the Rise of Administrative 
Government (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 14. University-based law pro-
fessors ought not to bear the sole blame for this development, however. Frankfurter's project 
would not have succeeded had practicing lawyers not shared his fears for the independence 
of the legal profession. Ronen Shamir, Managing Legal Uncertainty: Elite Lawyers in the 
New Deal (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995). 
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A Seminar in Statecraft 
In the end, then, Hurst had to look beyond Frankfurter for his fullest, most 
satisfying insight into the work of administrators during the Depression and 
New Deal. He would ultimately find it as a member of the Harvard Law 
Review. Looking back, Hurst considered the Review very much a part of 
his education. In fact, law review was "the best seminar any law school of-
fers," "an absolutely triple-A educational experience." As Note Editor he 
was both "merciless" and tireless. Each week would find Hurst closeted 
with a new author, often for many ten-hour days, as the two hammered out 
the "original draft together" in an intense, collaborative effort. The views 
expressed in the notes are as much a guide to Hurst's thinking as they are 
to that of their anonymous authors. 38 
Some of the notes Hurst edited addressed issues near the core of Frank-
furter's court-centered approach to administrative law. For example, a note 
on Panama Refining Company v. Ryan (the so-called "Hot Oil" case) at-
tempted to salvage something from the wreckage of the Supreme Court's 
attack on the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) under the delega-
tion doctrine. From the start Frankfurter had misgivings about the statute 
because of the danger that the National Recovery Administration would 
produce self-interested cartels instead of intelligently struck balances of 
private and public interests. Delegation was not an evil in itself, however. 
In fact, it was necessary if his farseeing administrators were to be free to 
perform their duties.39 
The note on Panama Refining that Hurst edited-in all likelihood, along 
lines Frankfurter himself suggested-argued that even after the decision a 
better-crafted delegation to a more established agency would easily survive 
constitutional review. Judicial deference to the ICC, for example, showed 
that courts would uphold delegations for matters requiring prompt action, 
facility with complex details, and expert knowledge. Congress's delegation 
to the National Recovery Administration, in contrast, neither mandated the 
"expert handling" of matters entrusted to it nor specified the process by 
which that expertise would be acquired or employed. Twenty years later, 
Hurst would, in effect, restate this argument by characterizing Panama 
Refining and the Schechter decision as "reactions to pressure-group legis-
lation, rather than as curbs on official agencies."40 
38. Hurst, Smail Interview, 6-8. I have been unable to identify the note Hurst wrote dur-
ing his second year at Harvard. 
39. Peter Irons, New Deal Lawyers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982),24; 
Nelson Lloyd Dawson, Louis D. Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, and the New Deal (Hamden, 
Conn.: Archon Books, 1980),63-70. 
40. "Delegation of Power by Congress," Harvard Law Review 48 (1935): 798-806; Willard 
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In other notes Hurst went beyond such Frankfurterian concerns to col-
laborate on studies of administrative bodies in their own right. One lengthy 
note, for example, reviewed the "unique body of authority on peacetime 
regulation of labor relations" produced under the NIRA by the first National 
Labor Relations Board (presided over by Hurst's future law dean, Lloyd 
Garrison). Even more impressive was a study of the consequences for "bod-
ies administrative and legislative rather than judicial" of the decline in rail-
road revenue brought on by the Great Depression and the rise of compet-
ing modes of transportation. Other notes addressed such landmarks of the 
New Deal as the Public Works Administration and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority.41 
In the "very select seminar" of the Harvard Law Review, then, Hurst at 
last acquired some direct insight into the working of the administrative state 
to complement the other lessons he was taught or taught himself at law 
school, such as the inherently political nature of common law reasoning, 
the functional origins of the administrative state, and the frailty of the del-
egation doctrine as an obstacle to the growth of administrative action. Once 
he reached the hospitable environment of Garrison's law school he would 
have the freedom and security to assemble a legal pedagogy and jurispru-
dence that responded, as he told the historian Hendrik Hartog, "to my own 
sense of the things that my own legal education had never given me."42 
Before doing so, he would extend his education with apprenticeships un-
der two of the most eminent figures in American legal history. In some 
respects, Frankfurter and Brandeis confirmed Hurst's views about law, his-
tory, and administration; in others, they presented him with examples he 
would have to outgrow or, in Brandeis's case, repress. 
"Public Policy in the Dimension of Time" 
After his graduation and a half-hearted testing of the market for young 
lawyers in Chicago, Hurst returned to Cambridge to serve as Frankfurter's 
research fellow during the 1935-36 academic year. The fellowship, which 
Hurst, "Review and the Distribution of National Powers," in Supreme Court and Supreme 
Law. ed. Edmond Cahn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1954), 161; Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. U.S .• 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
41. "The Decisions of the National Labor Relations Board," Harvard Law Review 48 
(1935): 630-59; "Railroad Revenue Problems As Affected by the Decline in Traffic," ibid., 
1382-1400; "PWA Loans and Grants for Municipally Owned Public Utilities," ibid. 47 
(1934): 89-95; "The Constitutionality of the TVA as a Power Development Program," ibid. 
48 (1935): 806-15. 
42. Hartog. "Snakes in Ireland," 382. 
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Frankfurter financed through private fund-raising, was already a well-es-
tablished stepping stone to Supreme Court clerkships with Holmes or Bran-
deis and a career as a law professor. The principal goal of the fellowship, 
as Frankfurter saw it, was "to win men of calibre for law teaching by giv-
ing them ... an apprenticeship taste of it." His success was borne out in 
the careers of Hurst and his predecessors, who included Paul A. Freund, 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., Wilber Katz, James M. Landis, David Riesman, Jr., 
Malcolm Sharp, and Harry Shulman.43 
Hurst's principal task was to help Frankfurter prepare a series of lectures 
on judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause in the nineteenth cen-
tury.44 The Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney, and l-lilite was Frank-
furter's attempt to illustrate the subtle, ad hoc nature of constitutional de-
velopment and, in the process, to advance Louis Brandeis's project of 
protecting the states' experiments in economic regulation from conserva-
tives on the Supreme Court. "The states need the amplest scope for ener-
gy and individuality in dealing with the myriad problems created by our 
complex industrial civilization," Frankfurter had argued in The Public and 
Its Government. In 1934 and 1935 he used similar terms in arguing that 
any system of unemployment insurance enacted by Congress should de-
fer to the existing programs of the states, such as the one Louis Brandeis's 
daughter and son-in-law, Elizabeth and Paul Raushenbush, had drafted for 
Wisconsin along lines suggested by the justice himself.45 
Frankfurter's lectures showed that the Constitution, properly interpret-
ed, did not stand in the way. The development of the Domlant Commerce 
Clause, in particular, was a matter of "practical necessities and shrewd 
judgments about practical matters," not deductions from "a technical rule 
of law." During its formative years the U.S. Supreme Court had weighed a 
variety of factors in coming to a decision in particular cases, including 
"state necessities, the fitness of state relief as against nation-wide action, 
the limited manifestation of a given evil or the limited benefits of its cor-
rection, [and] the actual interest of the whole country in a phenomenon 
43. Hurst, Smail Interview, 9; Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," 373; Circular Letter, 15 Feb-
ruary 1937, reel 88, FF-LC. 
44. In addition, Hurst audited two courses taught by Frankfurter, a seminar on legislation 
co-taught by James M. Landis, and Roscoe Pound's jurisprudence seminar. Pound's course 
struck Hurst as "a rather fruitless enterprise" presided over by a dogmatic, isolated, and 
"rather arrogant" figure. Its reading list would nonetheless serve as the point of departure 
for Hurst's own exploration of philosophical and social scientific work relating to law. Har-
tog, "Snakes in Ireland," 373, 374-75, 377; Hurst, Smail Interview, 9-10; Hurst to Lloyd 
K. Garrison, 3 June 1946, Box 5, Garrison Papers. 
45. Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney and Waite (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1937); Frankfurter, Public and Irs Government, 48; 
Dawson, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and the New Deal, 103-12. 
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especially virulent in a particular state." Although Frankfurter denied that 
the nineteenth-century cases could "be put in the categories of our own 
thought," the "dispassionate verdict of history" he announced looked to-
ward greater freedom for the states.46 
During the fall of 1935 and most of the winter, Hurst conducted the re-
search for the lectures with little guidance from Frankfurter. "My chore for 
him for that year was to bury myself in all the material I could find" about 
the Supreme Court and the Commerce Clause between 1789 and 1890. In 
December, Hurst submitted a tentative outline, an analysis of the relevant 
cases, and a list of the materials he had consulted. He offered the last, he 
explained, "Not as a Little Jack Horner gesture, or to show the extent of 
the investigation, so much as to bring out its limitations." The list was 
impressive, but the original sources were, as Hurst observed, "all primari-
ly legal," and he stuck close to constitutional historians-Charles Beard, 
Albert Beveridge, James Bradley Thayer, and Charles Warren-for "the 
general political and social atmosphere of the time." 
He then typed lengthy memoranda outlining successive phases in the 
development of the law. These did not amount to "a rough draft" of the three 
lectures, Hurst insisted, but they did serve as the principal basis for the 
remarkable two-week "seminar" Frankfurter conducted at his home on 
Brattle Street in early 1936, from which the manuscript emerged. "He'd 
pace the floor and talk, and when he said what he thought was the right 
way to grab the thought he had in mind I'd knock it off on the typewriter," 
Hurst recalled. Then Hurst would subject Frankfurter's text to a "very real, 
give-and-take criticism." "If I thought he wasn't getting the proper emphasis 
or was not getting the proper material out of the case," he explained, "I was 
supposed to barge in and argue with him." Given this approach, the rela-
tive contributions of Hurst and Frankfurter to the finished work are difficult 
to untangle from the surviving documents in Frankfurter's papers, but that 
record is consistent with both Hurst's claim that Frankfurter "put himself 
into what he wrote" and Frankfurter's acknowledgment of "the indispens-
able collaboration of Mr. Willard Hurst."47 
Frankfurter took away from the experience a lasting belief in Hurst's 
46. Frankfurter, Public and Its Government. 74, 77-78; Frankfurter, Commerce Clause, 
10,112. 
47. Hurst, Smail Interview, 10-11; Frankfurter, Commerce Clause ("Acknowledgments"); 
see also Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," 373. Frankfurter and Landis produced The Business 
of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System (New York: Macmillan, 1927) 
through a similar collaboration, although, as Stanley Kutler has suggested to me, Hurst never 
addressed Frankfurter with the sycophancy of Landis and other proteges. Donald A. Ritch-
ie, James M. Landis, Dean of the Regulators (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1980),21-22. 
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abilities. In the early months of 1937, he urged Dean Acheson to take the 
young Brandeis clerk under his wing. "I wonder if you have had a chance 
to penetrate beneath the surface of his shyness and social inexperience," 
Frankfurter wrote. "He is really an unusual fellow-a man of uncommon 
culture, refinement and maturity, but he ought to have more experience of 
the world than his devotion to his duties and his newness in Washington 
are likely to afford him." Less than a week later he again praised Hurst to 
Acheson: "Hurst is one of those rare creatures who does not need the sea-
soning that practice sometimes gives. As Marion said to me when he was 
here last year, 'Hurst is mature enough now to go on the bench.'" And, in 
commending Hurst to Lloyd Garrison, Frankfurter exclaimed,48 
I cannot speak too highly of his scholarly equipment, his penetrating mind, 
and the kind of integrity which suffuses the whole quality of a man's work 
and makes the difference between a teacher who imparts ferment and just a 
grubbing pedant. He is a shy, modest fellow, but a man of real firmness of 
character which is bound to leave its impress, by its intrinsic force, upon stu-
dents, colleagues, and the community. Grab him if you can! 
Beyond Originalism 
The fellowship had two significant consequences for Hurst, one lasting, the 
other of shorter duration. First, Hurst left the fellowship with an understand-
ing of constitutional history that all but incapacitated him as a producer of 
originalist arguments in constitutional litigation. In the lectures on the 
Commerce Clause Frankfurter stressed the historically contingent content 
of the Constitution and the corollary that past meanings could be revised 
in light of subsequent developments. "The Constitution of the United States 
is most significantly not a document but a stream of history," Frankfurter 
declared. He also quoted Holmes to argue that although history played a 
critical role in constitutional law-it "sets us free and enables us to make 
up our minds dispassionately"-it was not filled with authoritative com-
mands to the present.49 
Hurst reached a similar conclusion early in his research assistantship. 
In 1934 a New Deal lawyer, Robert L. Stern, argued in the Harvard Law 
Review that the unambiguous intent of the Framers in drafting the Com-
merce Clause was to check one state's infliction of injustice upon another, 
and not to constrain the federal government. The article quickly became a 
touchstone for New Dealers' efforts to expand the reach of the federal 
48. Frankfurter to Acheson, 7, 12 May 1937, reel II, FF-LC; Frankfurter to Garrison, 27 
February 1937, Box 192, FF-HLS. The "Marion" to whom Frankfurter referred in the pre-
ceding sentence was his wife, Marion Denman Frankfurter. 
49. Frankfurter, Commerce Clause, 2. 
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government, a goal that Hurst almost certainly supported. Nonetheless, 
Hurst objected that the meaning of the Commerce Clause should not be 
confined to the intent of the Framers. As Hurst put it, the clause should be 
understood "as a matter of history rather than of dialectic." Because Stern 
conceded that the "national powers should be what they were intended to 
be in 1787," he was obliged to exaggerate the economic nationalism of the 
Framers. He would have done better to have shown what the powers of the 
national government "were then intended to be, in order that it may more 
vividly be seen what they have become."50 
Hurst expressed similar views in a conference held at the New York 
University School of Law in 1953. Where a constitutional question involved 
"the definition of particular legal agencies or particular legal procedures," 
the words had "a precise, history-filled content" that judges had to respect. 
But in considering "grants of substantive power to be used in an indefinite 
future," judges needed to regard "the general political, economic, and so-
cial history of the United States" in the intervening years. To illustrate the 
proper interpretation of such general grants, Hurst referred to a favorite 
decision from Frankfurter's Commerce Clause book, Pensacola Telegraph 
Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., in which Chief Justice Waite updat-
ed earlier doctrine in light of the recently perfected technology of telegra-
phy. He also invoked Holmes's view, in Missouri v. Holland, that "our 
whole experience," and not merely "what was said a hundred years ago," 
was relevant to constitutional interpretation. To hold otherwise, Hurst be-
lieved, was to attempt to "evade the responsibilities of choice which resist-
less change will surely thrust upon" the present.51 
Hurst acknowledged that empowering judges to consult "general his-
tory, as compared with the history crystallized in particular decisions or 
authoritative documents," would expand their discretion, but he denied that 
objectivity or responsibility in judging would suffer as a result. Properly 
trained lawyers could help judges recover the historical record, "not just 
as it is read by anyone mind or even anyone generation, but as it emerg-
es in many-sided reality from the best consensus of many minds and many 
years." Astute judges could reach the decision that best addressed the so-
cial needs revealed through this inquiry. Thus, in Pensacola, "hardhead-
ed, fact-minded Waite looks at the way contracts are made, goods ordered 
and shipped, government administered at a distance, for his conclusion 
50. Willard Hurst, "Notes on the History of the 'Commerce Clause,'" [1935], reel 136, 
FF-LC; see Robert L. Stern, "That Commerce which Concerns More States than One," 
Harvard Law Review 47 (1934): 1335-66; Irons, New Deal Lawyers, 48. 
51. Willard Hurst, "The Process of Constitutional Construction: The Role of History," in 
Supreme Court and Supreme Law, 57, 56, 58; Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. I (1877); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920). 
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that history has brought the telegraph into the mainstream of interstate 
commerce."52 
Hurst's understanding of the past was too complex, its meaning too open 
to debate, for most constitutionallitigators, who looked to history for a sin-
gle, authoritative, and unambiguous "original understanding" with which 
to constrain judicial discretion. The appendix on the history of treason Hurst 
prepared over the winter of 1944-45 for the government's brief in Cramer 
v. United States remains a leading treatment of the subject, yet the Supreme 
Court lawyer Frederick Bernays Wiener complained that, by trading ad-
vocacy for objectivity, it weakened the prosecutors' case.53 In the 1950s, a 
sympathetic Hurst tried to help the NAACP in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion by reviewing the history of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in Wisconsin. Wisconsinites endorsed "equality of treatment before 
the law," Hurst explained to William T. Coleman, but their views were "log-
ically compatible with segregation." "Nothing in the Wisconsin materials 
seems to me to bear directly on the separate-but-equal position." Still, Hurst 
believed that history had something to offer the NAACP's case. Because 
the Equal Protection Clause was an open-ended standard, he told Thurgood 
Marshall, it should be interpreted in light of changing historical circum-
stances. "Matters which did not seem of prime public concern, or perhaps 
not of public concern at all, in one social environment, may, in the unfold-
ing of a new environment, take on [a] wholly different complexion." That 
explained why Chief Justice Waite expanded the reach of the Commerce 
Clause in the Pensacola case, Hurst told Marshall, and that, he implied, 
was why the Supreme Court should find new meaning in the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.54 
52. Hurst, "Role of History," 58. 
53. James Willard Hurst, The Law of Treason in the United States (Westport, Conn.: Green-
wood Publishing, 1971); J. Woodford Howard, Jr., "Advocacy in Constitutional Choice: The 
Cramer Treason Case, 1942-1945," American Bar Foundation Research Journal 1986: 399. 
For the timing of Hurst's work on the appendix, see "Willard Hurst," Box 7, Subject Files, 
WLS-UWA; Lloyd K. Garrison to Oliver Rundell, 20 September 1944, Box 55, Series III 
III, University of Wisconsin Archives, Memorial Library, Madison (hereafter General Cor-
respondence, WLS-UWA). 
54. Hurst had the research assistance of Herbert Gutman, later an eminent historian of the 
American working class, but at the time a graduate student in Wisconsin's history depart-
ment. Hurst to William T. Coleman, 28 July 1953, Accession M81--487, State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin, Madison; Hurst to Thurgood Marshall, 5 November 1953, Box I, 
Accession 81173, University of Wisconsin Archives, Memorial Library, Madison (hereafter 
JWH-UWA). On the NAACP lawyers, the historians, and Brown v. Board of Education, see 
Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976),618-26,634--41; Mark 
V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936-
1941 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 196-200. 
HeinOnline -- 18 Law & Hist. Rev. 22 2000
22 Law and History Review, Spring 2000 
Beyond the Judicial Process 
On the question of the value of history to constitutional interpretation, then, 
Hurst did not stray far from the position he held as Frankfurter's research 
fellow, which was quite close to his mentor's own view. But in regard to 
their mutual fascination with the history of the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
two men ultimately parted company. Hurst first encountered Frankfurter's 
captivating historical approach to the Court in courses on federal jurisdic-
tion and public utilities law. "He would just squeeze so much out of' a case, 
Hurst recalled. Frankfurter's fascination with the Supreme Court was in-
fectious, and, thanks to the research assistantship, Hurst got a larger dose 
of it than most of the professor's many proteges. He would need several 
years of law teaching half a continent away from Cambridge before he 
could envision an alternative to his mentor's court-centered legal history.55 
Frankfurter's continuing influence was evident in Hurst's first legal his-
tory course, the seminar with Hesseltine on the history of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and in a series of book reviews published in 1938 and 1939, in which 
Hurst pilloried histories of the Court, biographies of its justices, and a 
handbook of constitutional history for, in effect, ignoring the concerns that 
animated Frankfurter. The handbook, for example, in Hurst's judgment 
overlooked "the economic and social conflicts which find expression in 
constitutional doctrine" and the "matters of procedure and of technique in 
advocacy and decision" that constrained the justices' decision making.56 
At some point in the late 1930s, Hurst struck out in a new direction. ("I 
didn't wanted to wind up knowing nothing except all the gossip about the 
judges," he later explained.) The impetus was his development, between 
1938 and 1940, of an ambitious course on public policy toward injuries in 
the workplace, which took as its starting point a more modest set of mate-
rials Garrison assembled before Hurst's arrival. Hurst and Garrison wanted 
the "Law in Society" course to "expose students to a much broader range 
of legal agencies than just courts. We wanted something that would involve 
the development of legislation and administrative law particularly." That it 
did, first by tracing a single case through the legal process and then by re-
tracing the development of the law of workplace injury from its common 
law origins through the triumph of worker's compensation. "I already was 
55. Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," 373, 377. 
56. Hurst to Frankfurter, 27 September 1938, Box 192, FF-HLS; Willard Hurst, review 
of Handbook of American Constitutional Law, by Henry Rottschaefer, Harvard Law Review 
53 (1939): 350-51. See also Willard Hurst, review of The Life of John McLean, by Francis 
P. Weisenburger, Harvard Law Review 51 (1938): 1306-10; Willard Hurst, review of Mr. 
Justice Miller and the Supreme Court 1862-1890, by Charles Fairman, Columbia Law Re-
view 40 (1940): 564-71; Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," 376. 
HeinOnline -- 18 Law & Hist. Rev. 23 2000
Hurst and the Administrative State 23 
in legal history more or less with that course," Hurst recalled. "Law in So-
ciety" was "a history course," but "not in any antiquarian sense." Rather, it 
was a study of "the development of public policy in the dimension of time."57 
Early in 1940, Hurst reported to Frankfurter on his plans for a "'large 
canvas legal history.'" That autumn, as he was readying requests for per-
mission to reprint material for "Law in Society," he also received Justice 
Brandeis's approval of his "thrilling" plans for "an intensive study ofWis-
consin's economic-legal history." By 1941 students working under his grant 
from the National Youth Administration had compiled a digest of the de-
cisions of the Wisconsin supreme court in terms of the industries out of 
which the cases arose. Hurst settled upon the lumber industry after a reve-
latory encounter with the environmentalist Aldo Leopold at a university 
dining club. He made some "test soundings" before leaving for Washing-
ton and the Board of Economic Warfare in February 1942. In 1942 he 
published a research agenda that took social function, not doctrine, as its 
organizing principle. "The more we examine law not in terms of doctrinal 
classification, but in terms of a given economic or cultural function or ac-
tivity upon which it plays from all sides," he concluded, "the more we may 
learn about the wise choice of regulations, the more broadly we may ap-
praise accomplishments and plan for the future."58 
As readers of his later work know well, Hurst's aspirations for a legal 
history that comprised the administrative and legislative processes as well 
as litigation survived his "limited experience as a bureaucrat" during World 
57. Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," 377; Hurst, Smail Interview, 25, 23-24, 20. On the "Law 
in Society" course, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Willard Hurst, Master of the Legal Pro-
cess," Wisconsin Law Review 1997: 1181-89, and Ernst, "The Ideal and the Actual in the 
State." Hurst insisted that he and Garrison "framed it together." Garrison thought otherwise. 
"Law in Society is really a most interesting course," Garrison wrote to David Riesman, Jr., 
in a vain attempt to lure him to Wisconsin, "and I can say this without immOdesty, since my 
own contribution to it in the way of material has been very minor, and the big job has been 
done by Hurst." In 1960 Garrison refused a share of the royalties when Carl Auerbach and 
Samuel Mermin published a revised edition. "My own contribution to the book was mini-
mal at the outset, except in terms of enthusiasm; the basic ideas were Willard's, and I did 
no more than fill in a few chinks." Hurst, Smail Interview, 20; Garrison to Riesman, 26 May 
1942, Box 54, General Correspondence, WLS-UWA; Garrison to Carl A. Auerbach, 18 April 
1960, Box 5, Garrison Papers. 
58. Frankfurter to Hurst, 17 April 1940, reel 39, part 3, FF-HLS; Brandeis to Hurst, 19 
October 1940, reel 33, LDB-HLS; Hurst to Thurman Arnold, 4 November 1940, Thurman 
Arnold Papers, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, Laramie; James Willard 
Hurst, comp., "A Digest of Regional Sources for the Study of the Economic and Political 
History of the Law: Volume One: The Wisconsin Reports, I Pinney (\839) through 235 
Wisconsin (1940)" (N.p., 1941); Hurst to Dan Dykstra, 7 April 1953, Box I, JWH-UWA; 
Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," 379; Hurst to Garrison, 10 August 1945, Box 57, General Cor-
respondence, WLS-UWA; Hurst, "Research Program," 325, 329. 
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War II. Hurst would take almost two decades after his demobilization to 
publish his great exemplar of the functional approach to law, Law and 
Economic Growth, but the extent to which his views on legal history had 
departed from those of his mentor was obvious as early as 1955. When 
Frankfurter sent Hurst a reprint of his contribution to the Harvard Law 
School's conference on the bicentennial of John Marshall's birth, the one-
time student replied to his old professor that he hoped Harvard might "stir 
itself once in a while in coming years ... to acknowledge the existence of 
other processes of government" than the judicial. "We continue to be a very 
Iitigious-process-biased group of legal scholars," he continued, "and I am 
discouraged at the scant signs among the newest generation of law teach-
ers of any large amount of interest in venturing into more original research 
in the legislative and administrative fields." The Harvard Law School would 
have done better to sponsor a conference on "the chief executive as law 
maker" or celebrate the work of a great governor, like AI Smith of New 
York. If the justice's response to this suggestion, made at the dawn of the 
Warren Court, ever took written form, it does not, apparently, survive.59 
Isaiah's Apprentice 
After his year with Frankfurter, Hurst embarked on a second "working part-
nership," this time with "an aged master of the craft." As a rule, relations 
between the eighty-year-old Justice Brandeis and his twenty-six-year-old 
clerk were formal and businesslike, thanks to the justice's "jealous guard-
ianship of his own privacy." Personal exchanges, if few, were among Hurst's 
most treasured memories. One was Brandeis's confiding remark, in the midst 
of the Court-packing controversy, that FOR was too much the "smart man," 
who short-sightedly grasped at an immediate political victory to the long-
term detriment of governmental institutions. Another was the justice's ver-
dict on Woodrow Wilson's doomed campaign for the League of Nations: it 
showed "the ever-present need that men be conscious of the limits of their 
physical, moral and mental energy, and not overcommit themselves." A third 
was Hurst's Thanksgiving dinner with Brandeis, where the guests included 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the social reformer Monsignor John Ryan, and 
Frankfurter's model administrator, Joseph Eastman.60 
59. Hurst to Mark Howe, I 1anuary 1953, Box 3, Howe Papers; Hurst to Frankfurter, 18 
October 1955, reel 42, FF-LC; Frankfurter, "10hn Marshall and the 1udicial Function," in 
Of Law and Men: Papers and Addresses of Felix Frankfurter, 1939-1956 (New York: Har-
court Brace, 1956), 3-30. 
60. Hurst, Smail Interview, 15; Hurst to Alpheus Thomas Mason, 3 November 1941, quot-
ed in Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man's Life (New York: Viking Press, 1946),643; Hurst to 
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Like other Brandeis clerks, Hurst did most of his work for the justice in 
one of the two apartments Brandeis rented on California Street north of 
Dupont Circle, except for occasional research trips to the Supreme Court 
or the Library of Congress. "At the start of the year, just to get me into the 
swing of things and keep me busy," Hurst wrote short memoranda on pe-
titions for certiorari. The bulk of his work, however, was to assist Bran-
deis in completing opinions the justice had already drafted. Hurst's job was 
to check Brandeis's statement of the facts of the case against the record, 
find precedential or statutory authority for any unsubstantiated legal claim, 
and generally to "argue with him wherever 1 found anything that 1 felt called 
for arguing."61 
Brandeis did set limits on Hurst. He was not free to raise "points of ac-
ademic interest," Hurst recalled, and once, when he wrote a "hot little 
piece" urging Brandeis to vote to take up an immigration case in which an 
"obvious injustice had been done," the justice adopted a "rather hard-boiled 
attitude" and lectured him that the Supreme Court could only consider cases 
presenting broad issues of public policy. When Hurst could not find an 
authority for Brandeis's claim in Senn that the "freedom of speech ... 
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution" extended to unions' publicizing 
the facts of a labor dispute, Brandeis simply smiled and replied, "I think 
we'll let it stand anyway." David Riesman, Jr., Brandeis's clerk during the 
preceding year, had a similar experience. "We have had several good scraps 
about policy," Riesman wrote to Frankfurter in November 1935, "but re-
membering your warning, 1 don't push him when 1 see his mind is made 
up-as it generally is."62 
Within limits, then, Hurst felt as free as if he "were back at the Harvard 
Law Review, editing some piece of writing" by one of his classmates. In 
one case the young man suggested that Brandeis should not "so baldly" 
claim that a precedent had been overruled; in another he drew the justice's 
attention to "a rather ambiguous" use of a word; in a third he observed that 
"a bit more charity" was in order in describing the actions of a district 
judge, "in view of the slightly dubious virtue" of the Court's own resort to 
Charles E. Wyzanski, 20 March 1954, Box I, JWH-UWA; Hurst to Frankfurter, 20 Decem-
ber 1955, reel 42, FF-LC. I am grateful to Alfred S. Konefsky for drawing my attention to 
Hurst's communication with Mason. 
61. Hurst, Smail Interview, 13, 14-15. On Brandeis and his clerks, see Philippa Strum, 
Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1984),354-61. 
62. Hurst, Smail Interview, 15, 13-14; Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 478; Hurst 
to Philippa Strum, 3 October 1980, quoted in Strum, Justice for the People, 360-61; Ries-
man to Frankfurter, 21 November 1935, quoted in Dawson, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and the 
New Deal, 131. 
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a per curiam opinion. Hurst even offered Brandeis grammatical advice, 
albeit "with humility."63 
Once again, Hurst impressed a mentor. "You cannot be unaware of the 
fact that you are giving the Justice help and comfort," Frankfurter wrote 
to Hurst in October 1936. In fact, Hurst worked so hard that the justice 
became concerned. "You are making good progress," Brandeis assured him 
in January 1937. "Don't fail to get adequate sleep within the next 24 hours." 
In May, Frankfurter could report to Dean Acheson that the justice consid-
ered Hurst "the best secretary, professionally speaking, he has ever had."64 
The Presumption of Constitutionality 
Hurst was convinced that he had witnessed a "constitutional crisis" in the 
years 1936 and 1937 when a majority of the Court clashed with "a con-
fused and troubled general public hit by the depression." The end of the 
crisis came with a "breakthrough" in public policy, the Court's unambigu-
ous decision to presume the constitutionality of statutes and administra-
tive decisions regulating economic interests. Hurst thoroughly approved of 
the "presumption of constitutionality," and it became an abiding concern 
of his teaching and writing.65 
For Hurst, the rule that "a statute is constitutional until a challenger plain-
ly shows the contrary" was much more than a rhetorical flourish. Properly 
understood, it was "a somewhat complex structure" that effectively prevent-
ed the judiciary from questioning the facts and "fact-enmeshed values" 
found by legislatures and administrators. The presumption put a heavy 
burden of proof on the party challenging a statute or regulation. "The at-
63. Hurst, Smail Interview, 15; "No. 40, Atlantic Refining Co. v. Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia (Sup. Ct. App. Va., 1936), Due Process and Commerce Clause Issues since Cudahy 
Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460," n.d., 2, reel 27, LDB-HLS; "No. 32, Duke Power Co. 
v. Greenwood County (C.C.A. 4th), Re. draft of opinion," 28 November 1936, I, reel 25, 
ibid.; "No. 32, Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County (C.C.A. 4th), Re. draft of Per curiam 
opinion," 10 December 1936, 2, ibid.; "No. 22, State Board of Equalization vs. Young's 
Market Co., Re. Draft of opinion," n.d., 2, reel 26, ibid. 
64. Frankfurter to Hurst, 22 October 1936, reel 39, FF-HLS; L. D. B. to W. H., 17 Janu-
ary 1937, reel 27, LDB-HLS; Frankfurter to Dean Acheson, 12 May 1937, reell1, FF-LC. 
The qualification-"professionally speaking"-may indicate that Brandeis thought Hurst was 
less adept at his famous "teas" than his more socially assured predecessors-such as 
Acheson-had been. On the teas, see Strum, Justice for the People, 362; Bruce Allen Mur-
phy, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political Activities of the Supreme 
Court Justices (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1983), 120-23. 
65. Hurst to Robert W. Gordon, n.d. This document is among papers in the possession of 
Arthur F. McEvoy, the 1. Willard Hurst Professor of Law and History at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison Law School. Hereafter I refer to these papers as JWH-AFM. I am grate-
ful to Professor McEvoy for permission to examine them. 
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tacker must establish either that the legislators could not reasonably find 
facts to exist creating the problem with which the statute purports to deal, 
or that they could not reasonably determine that the statute represents a 
socially acceptable value or a means calculated to achieve that value." By 
taking "judicial notice" of facts not appearing in the record, sympathetic 
judges could help attackers overcome the burden, but Hurst thought they 
should do so only if the matter was "beyond reasonable dispute by men 
knowledgeable in the field."66 
Hurst often associated the presumption of constitutionality with Bran-
deis, who had memorably stated it in O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford 
Insurance Co. (1931) and, in dissent, in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 
(1932).67 In a tribute to Brandeis in 1966, for example, Hurst spoke of the 
justice's "regular, realistic search for facts" as he reviewed the ends and 
means of legislation. His fastidiousness in doing this, Hurst maintained, 
was a sign of Brandeis's "stern self discipline." Like other admirers of 
Brandeis, Hurst could cite many cases in support of his portrait of the jus-
tice as a proponent of judicial restraint. Yet Hurst could also recall cases 
in which he was more eager than his justice to promote the growth of 
"something like an area of prerogative power" among administrators and 
executive officials.68 
Hurst might have cited Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman to illustrate Brandeis's 
deference to a regulatory initiative. In this case the plaintiff challenged 
Maine's scheme of licensing the sale of cosmetics as a burden on interstate 
commerce. After a year's study of the Dormant Commerce Clause with 
Frankfurter and armed with Brandeis's opinions on the presumption of 
constitutionality, Hurst made short work of the issue. First he observed that 
the plaintiff had challenged the statute before it went into operation. After 
reviewing the case law, he concluded that "the statute does not on its face 
impose unreasonable and excessive fees." To that extent, at least, it was not 
a direct burden on interstate commerce. Should Brandeis go further and 
66. James Willard Hurst, Dealing with Statutes (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1982),88,89,95; Hurst, "Legal Elements," 55, 51. 
67. O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931); New State lee 
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280--311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Hurst included 
both cases in Willard Hurst, Some Problems in the Relationship of the Legislative and Judi-
cial Processes (Madison: College Typing Co., 1938). 
68. Willard Hurst, "A Tribute," 28 January 1966, in Student Bar Association, University 
of Louisville, School of Law, Fiftieth Anniversary Convocation of Justice Brandeis's Ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court of the United States (Louisville, Ky.: University of Louis-
ville School of Law, 1966), 2; Hurst, Growth of American Law, 399-400. Neither West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), nor NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 
U.S. I (1937), was assigned to Brandeis, and so Hurst had no occasion to prepare memo-
randa on these celebrated cases of judicial deference to legislatures. 
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consider the actual operation of the licensing scheme since the start of the 
suit? No, said Hurst. Under the presumption of constitutionality, the chal-
lenger in some future attack on the statute was responsible for gathering 
that evidence. "This Court may not go beyond the record and take judicial 
notice of the operation of the Act since the hearing." On this issue Bran-
deis's opinion generally followed Hurst's reasoning.69 
On at least three other occasions, however, the two men disagreed, with 
Hurst inclining toward greater freedom for administrators and Brandeis 
toward sustaining the superiority of the judiciary. Because Hurst worked 
within limits set by his "master," some of these disagreements must be 
inferred from subtle differences of treatment. The Bourjois case provides 
one example. The plaintiff had argued that, by failing to provide applicants 
with a hearing before a denial of a license, Maine had violated constitu-
tional guarantees of due process. Hurst advised Brandeis to write that hear-
ings were never necessary if applicants could obtain judicial review of 
administrative decisions. This went too far for Brandeis. He kept open the 
possibility of a future constitutional challenge to other statutes by adding 
the words "under the circumstances and of the character here involved" to 
those Hurst proposed.70 
In a second case, Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Louisville & Nashville 
Railroad Co., Brandeis vigorously attacked the settled practice of an ad-
ministrative agency, while Hurst did what he could to limit the holding. The 
case was a suit filed by two shippers to recover damages from railroads that 
had charged them in excess of the rate specified by the "Combination Rule" 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The rule directed railroads to use 
a special formula in calculating freight rates whenever the Commission had 
not published a through rate for at least one route between two points. In 
seeming conflict with the language of the rule, the ICC had long construed 
it to apply when it had published a through rate over one or more routes, 
but not over the particular route a shipment would take. 
The shippers argued that the federal courts had to accept the ICC's con-
struction of the rule because it involved "the exercise of sound adminis-
trative discretion as to technical and intricate matters of tariff application 
and the relation of tariffs to one another," but Brandeis disagreed. The dis-
puted language of the Combination Rule-"where no published through 
rates are in effect from point of origin to destination"-was "not techni-
69. "No. 534, Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman (D. Me. 1936), Re. draft of opinion," 6 April 1937, 
reel 25, LDB-HLS. Hurst also turned back the objection that the statute improperly dele-
gated legislative power to establish rules and regulations. After surveying decisions on the 
regulation of lobster fishing, motor buses, and plumbing fixtures, he concluded that "dele-
gation is as much an accepted thing in Maine today as anywhere else." Ibid., 17-18. 
70. Ibid., 22; "No. 534," n.d., 4, ibid.; Bourjois. Inc. v. Chapman. 30 I U.S. 183, 189 (1937). 
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cal," he replied. Its interpretation was "a question of law, not differing in 
character from those presented when the construction of any other docu-
ment is in dispute." If the ICC wanted to lower rates over the routes in 
question, it should hold hearings and establish a joint through rate, as the 
Interstate Commerce Act provided.71 
Most of Hurst's memo on the case helped Brandeis sharpen or substan-
tiate his argument, but at the end he raised a query. Should not Brandeis 
distinguish Brown from another case, cited by the shippers, which held that 
constructions of a statute by the body charged with enforcing it must be 
read into the statute if the construction was "not plainly erroneous," had 
"long obtained in practical execution," and had "been impliedly sanctioned 
by the reenactment of the statute without alteration in the particulars con-
strued"? As Hurst would observe in The Growth of American Law, the 
emergence of such doctrines was a precondition for the development of an 
administrative "prerogative." Brandeis's holding ran against this trend. In 
1936, to limit the damage, Hurst proposed that Brandeis declare that the 
ICC's construction was "plainly erroneous" and expressly note that the case 
involved "nothing as authoritative over the Court as intervening acquies-
cence by the legislature." Again Hurst's efforts proved unsuccessful. Bran-
deis's opinion in Brown in no way acknowledged Hurst's suggestion.72 
In a final case the conflict between master and apprentice was explicit 
and squarely involved the presumption of constitutionality. Thompson v. 
Consolidated Gas Utilities Corporation was a challenge by one group of 
natural gas companies located in the Texas Panhandle to an order of the 
state's Railroad Commission that favored another. Both groups produced 
"sweet" gas, which was relatively free of sulfur and usable in heating and 
lighting, unlike high-sulfur "sour" gas, which was usable only for the 
making of carbon black, a residue left after burning gas, used in the pro-
duction of paint and rubber.73 The first group owned or controlled pipelines 
that permitted them to deliver gas directly from their wells to consumers. 
Unlike these "integrated" companies, the second group-the "indepen-
dents"-had no access to pipelines. The only profitable use of the gas they 
pumped was to "strip" it of its gasoline content and sell the residue to pro-
71. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 299 U.S. 393, 398, 397, 
400 (1937). 
72. "No. 100, WP. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. (C.C.A. 
6th 1936): Re. draft of opinion." 27 December 1936, 3, reel2S, LDB-HLS; New York, New 
Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. 200 U.S. 361, 401-402 
(1906); Hurst, Growth of American Low, 399-400. 
73. I am grateful to Professor Christopher J. Castaneda of the History Department at the 
California State University at Sacramento for insights into Texas's natural gas industry in 
the 1930s. 
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ducers of carbon black. In the process they wasted a significant amount of 
the gas in the subterranean field. 74 
In 1935 the Texas legislature prohibited the use of sweet gas for the 
production of carbon black. It also authorized the Railroad Commission 
to prorate the production of natural gas in order to (1) prevent waste; or 
(2) adjust "the correlative rights and opportunities of each owner of gas in 
a common reservoir." Citing this authority, the commission ordered the 
integrated companies to produce significantly below the levels required to 
meet their existing contracts with their customers. The integrated compa-
nies could have easily met their commitments with gas pumped from their 
own wells, but, thanks to the order, they were forced to buy gas from the 
only other readily available source, the independents. The integrated com-
panies were thus required to pay the independents for gas they would not 
have needed but for the proration order.75 
Had the case not invol ved an administrative body but merely a judicial 
or legislative reallocation of property rights, Brandeis might not have ob-
jected. After all, in International News Service v. Associated Press, Bran-
deis had turned aside a natural rights claim to property in the news with 
the observation that property rights were a creation of the legal order. He 
even ventured the suggestion that a legislature might declare newspapers 
businesses affected with a public interest. And in Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, Brandeis voted to uphold a statute forbidding coal companies 
from causing the subsidence of surface land, even when the companies had 
purchased the surface owner's right of support. 76 
But Thompson reached the Court after Brandeis had become alarmed by 
the growth of administrative power under the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act and other New Deal statutes. In his dissent in New State Ice he had 
warned that such measures might make excessive demands "upon the hu-
man intelligence and character of men," and with his vote in Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States he struck at the public cartelization of in-
dustry. Finding in Thompson that the public allocation of market share had 
survived Schechter, he reacted with a vehemence more commonly associ-
ated with one of the Four Horsemen. "Our law reports present no more 
glaring instance of the taking of one man's property and giving it to an-
other," Brandeis thundered.77 
74. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 58-61 (1937). 
75. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 63, 78. 
76. International News Servo V. Associated Press, 250,267 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Penn-
sylvania Coal CO. V. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,416-22 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
77. Schechter Poultry Corp. V. United States; Dawson, Brandeis, Frankfurter. and the New 
Deal, 129-30; Thompson V. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 79. 
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At first Brandeis wanted to attack the order on statutory grounds and 
avoid a constitutional holding, as had the district judge who originally heard 
the case. Arguing that the statute authorized proration only to prevent waste 
and that the commission had not shown that the integrated companies had 
wasted gas, the judge concluded that the commission's order was ultra vires 
and void. Such reasoning would permit Brandeis to hamstring the Railroad 
Commission without explicitly rebuking the Texas legislature. 
Hurst would have nothing of it. Presumably he preferred a statutory 
holding to a constitutional one as the more easily surmountable barrier for 
the administrative state, but he was convinced that there was no factual 
support for the district judge's reasoning in the legislative record. He 
showed Brandeis that the Texas legislature had authorized the proration 
scheme to go beyond the common law in protecting the independents' in-
terest in subterranean gas and to compensate them for revenue lost as a 
result of the ban on producing carbon black. The proration scheme was 
"part of a general plan to combat waste with what the legislature conceives 
[as] fairness to all sides," Hurst insisted. It mixed "the idea of waste pre-
vention and adjustment of rights of pool-owners in inextricable fashion." 
He concluded, "I do not believe the orders can fairly be called ultra vires 
even by the construction-which-will-avoid-grave-constitutional-doubts 
incantation."78 
Brandeis was slow to surrender this line of argument, and on December 
17 he returned the memorandum setting out Hurst's views and instructed 
his law clerk to study the legislative history again. Hurst replied later the 
same day that "another period of reflection on the statute leaves me still 
unregenerate." He observed Christmas by writing two memoranda on the 
case. One showed that the Texas legislature had established similar poli-
cies for the oil industry in order to "open up the pipe line companies' 
markets to the independents." Another surveyed Texas cases on the regu-
lation of motor carriers, the spacing of wells, the location of high schools, 
the valuation of property for tax purposes, and the closure of roads to es-
tablish that the findings of the Railroad Commission were reviewable only 
under the relatively deferential "substantial evidence" standard and that they 
were not subject to de novo review.79 
78. "No. 89, Thompson et al., R.R. Comm. of Texas v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp. 
(W.O. Tex. 1936): Re. Construction of Statute," 17 December 1936, 3,4,5,4, reel 26, LDB-
HLS. 
79. WH, untitled memorandum, 17 December 1936, ibid.; "No. 89, Thompson et al., R.R. 
Comm. of Texas v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp. (W.O. Tex. \936), Re. history of oil 
proration in Texas," 25 December 1936,4, ibid.; "No. 89. Thompson et al., R.R. Comm. of 
Texas v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp. (W.O. Tex. 1936): Re. Texas law on review of 
administrative findings," 25 December 1936, ibid. In an earlier memorandum Hurst observed 
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After a meeting on January 7, Brandeis finally conceded Hurst's point. 
But rather than uphold the statute under the presumption of constitution-
ality, as perhaps Hurst believed he would, Brandeis resolved to strike it 
down on constitutional grounds. True, the justice wrote in his opinion, "all 
administrative regulations purporting to be made under authority legally 
delegated" enjoyed the benefit of "a presumption of the existence of facts 
justifying the specific exercise" of legislative power. The proration order 
would nonetheless be unconstitutional if "shown to bear no reasonable 
relation either to the prevention of waste or the protection of correlative 
rights, or if shown to be otherwise arbitrary." In Thompson, Brandeis con-
cluded that the integrated companies had sustained "the heavy burden of 
overcoming the presumption and of establishing that the order is an arbi-
trary taking of their property."80 . 
In fact, the plaintiffs succeeded less from their own efforts than from the 
ingenious reading of the record that Hurst dutifully produced for Brandeis, 
who incorporated it into his decision. That Hurst had not succeeded in 
convincing himself became clear later in the term in a separate case chal-
lenging the statute's ban on the use of sweet gas to produce carbon black. 
Brandeis voted to uphold the ban, leaving it to his clerk to explain why the 
presumption of constitutionality had not been overcome in that case as well. 
After proposing language that turned aside the plaintiff's argument, Hurst 
declared himself "a bit troubled as to whether this skeptical treatment" was 
consistent with Thompson. Brandeis, evidently, was not. "No facts have 
been found, or established by evidence, which would justify us in pronounc-
ing the action of the Legislature arbitrary," he flatly wrote. 81 
The Thompson decision was troubling for anyone inclined to cast Bran-
deis as an advocate of judicial self-restraint. Frankfurter, for example, told 
Hurst in 1938 that Thompson "bothered" him, and he suggested that Bran-
deis was not following "his own canons of constitutional adjudication." If 
that the public's interest in the natural gas industry was "obviously not for the amateur lightly 
to decide" and wondered how Brandeis could tell whether the district judge had abused his 
discretion in finding no substantial evidence of waste when the record did not make clear 
what evidence had been before the Commission. "No. 89, Thompson et aI., R.R. Comm. of 
Texas v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp. (WD. Tex. 1936): Re. the conflicts in evidence, 
and findings," 20 December 1936, 4, 15, ibid. 
80. "No. 89, Thompson et aI., R.R. Comm. of Texas v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp. 
(WD. Tex. 1936): Re. Construction and Constitutional Issues," 7 January 1937, reel 27, ibid.; 
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Uti/so Corp., 69-70. 
81. "No. 89, Thompson, et aI., R.R. Comm. of Texas V. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp. 
(WD. Tex. 1936): Re. Findings for use in opinion, and conflicts of evidence," 18 December 
1936, reel 26, LDB-HLS; "No. 397, Henderson CO. V. Thompson, et al. (W.D. Tex. 1936): 
Re. draft of opinion," 20 February 1937,4, ibid.; Henderson Co. v. Thompsoll, 300 U.S. 258, 
264 (1937). 
HeinOnline -- 18 Law & Hist. Rev. 33 2000
Hurst and the Administrative State 33 
Hurst also believed Brandeis was wilfully manipulating his own principles, 
how could he have declared, years later, that the justice "leaves to lawyers 
no legacy more important than his example of the responsible holding of 
power"?82 
Perhaps Frankfurter's passing verdict on Thompson, delivered almost two 
decades later, provides a clue. In the same address on John Marshall that 
prompted Hurst to call for a Harvard-sponsored conference on Al Smith, 
Frankfurter claimed that Brandeis could not possibly have been motivated 
by "narrow economic views" in deciding the case. Rather, by protecting 
property in the circumstances it presented, Brandeis believed he was up-
holding "an aspect of liberty." Hurst might similarly have believed that, 
although Brandeis accepted legislative intervention into the market, the 
justice thought that an administrative state capable of regulating all walks 
of economic life on its own initiative held greater potential for evil than 
concentrated power in private hands. As Hurst once told Charles Wyzan-
ski, "The justice's skepticism of men's capacity to handle themselves well 
in the face of demands made by the great institutions they had set up, ex-
tended fully, I think, to government." Thompson might have upset the leg-
islative expression of the popular will, but only to prevent the creation of 
an administrative body capable of more wide-ranging and intrusive incur-
sions into civil society. Such reasoning might have struck Hurst as being 
consistent with Brandeis's "working philosophical frame for action," even 
though he did not share the justice's fears.83 
Whatever Hurst's musings in private, in print he did not attempt to rec-
oncile Thompson with Brandeis's commitment to the presumption of con-
stitutionality. True, in his Curti Lectures of 1981 Hurst wrote that "as citi-
zen, Brandeis urged the wisdom of restraint in invoking the force of law and 
the desirability of maintaining the freedom of genuinely competitive mar-
kets." He supported this claim with Brandeis's testimony before Congress 
in 1915: "wherever you do not have to curtail liberty, wherever the exer-
cise of full liberty by a businessman is consonant with the public welfare, 
public policy demands that we should allow him that liberty, because free-
dom is the fundamental basis of our Government and of our prosperity." He 
added Brandeis's advice to the reformer Robert Bruere in 1922: "Remedi-
al institutions are apt to fall under the control of the enemy and to become 
instruments of oppression." But when Hurst turned to consider Brandeis "as 
judge," he insisted that the justice "would leave to legislatures broad scope 
82. Frankfurter to Hurst, 10 June 1938, reel 39, FF-HLS; Hurst, "Tribute," 2; see Clyde 
Spillenger, "Reading the Judicial Canon: Alexander Bickel and the Book of Brandeis," Jour-
nal of American History 79 (1992): 125-51. 
83. Frankfurter, "John Marshall and the Judicial Function," 20; Hurst to Wyzanski, 20 
March 1954, Box 1, JWH-VWA; Hurst, "Tribute," 2. 
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for making reasonable determinations when legislation regulating the pri-
vate market would serve the public interest." In support Hurst cited Bran-
deis's opinions in O'Gorman & Young and New State Ice. Some acknowl-
edgment of Thompson is, in retrospect, conspicuous by its absence.84 
Life's Work 
In the autumn of 1937 Hurst joined the law faculty of the University of 
Wisconsin in Madison, a short train ride from his hometown. Among those 
who greeted the young professor with some skepticism was a student 
named Clark Byse. In one of their first discussions Byse asked Hurst wheth-
er he did not think he ought to have practiced law before trying to teach it. 
Hurst, who had turned down an offer from Solicitor General Stanley Reed 
to join Garrison's law school, replied that the same question had occurred 
to him. He had asked Brandeis for his advice and had been satisfied with 
the justice's reply. "It is time for you to be about your life's work," the 
justice had said.85 
Hurst conceived of that work as the fashioning of a legal pedagogy and 
jurisprudence to justify the twentieth-century growth of administrative ca-
pacity in the United States without sacrificing the traditional values of Amer-
ican democracy. As a law professor he charted his own path between lais-
sez-faire and socialism, guided by the notion of law as a "sustained ordering 
of values," expressed in a wide variety of exercises of official power that 
were functional to the full social development of the individuals within its 
domain. He would train lawyers to think of themselves not so much as offic-
ers of the court as "officer[s] of the state" and to use law in all its forms to 
address the needs of society. He would make good Pound's promise of a 
"sociological jurisprudence" by writing history that identified the values of 
a humane society and showed how they could be advanced in particular 
historical contexts. He would usually conclude that common law courts 
could not meet the challenges of modern societies on their own, but he would 
invariably stop short of a call for aggressive planning by a centralized state. 
Like Brandeis, he believed that such planning called for more virtue and 
rationality than the planners could possibly possess. "The key problem," he 
84. James Willard Hurst, Law and Markets in United States History: Different Modes of 
Bargaining among Interests (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 118. I am 
grateful to Charles W. McCurdy for drawing my attention to this passage. 
85. Stanley Reed to Willard Hurst, 18 May 1937, Box 243, Stanley Reed Papers, Univer-
sity of Kentucky; Interview of Clark Byse, 20 December 1997. Byse quickly became an 
admirer. Lloyd K. Garrison to Hurst, 24 December 1937, Box 43, General Correspondence, 
WLS-UWA. 
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Fig. 2. James Willard Hurst, University of Wisconsin Law Faculty, 1941. Courtesy of 
the University of Wisconsin Law School. 
wrote in 1942, "will be whether we can devise interacting schemes, or plot 
interrelated regions of official and non-official direction of the economy, so 
as not to overload the official machinery hopelessly beyond the capacity of 
ordinary human foresight and strength."86 
In time Hurst would find some of his most fundamental assumptions 
challenged by a younger generation. When student radicals at Madison 
quoted Walden and denounced the "expediency" of interest-group politics, 
Hurst retorted that "Thoreau's wholesale rejection of legal processes as 
instruments of humane values is a piece of utopian self-righteousness 
which, insofar as it is not empty, is calculated to hurt rather than help the 
human condition." Echoing Cozzens, he implicitly likened the student rad-
ical to "someone who at age eight discovered there was no Santa Claus and 
86. Hurst, "Old and New Dimensions," 3; Hurst, "The Content of Courses in Legislation," 
University of Chicago Law Review 8 (1941): 294; Hurst, "Research Program," 332. 
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never got over it."87 When his colleague Mark Tushnet observed that "the 
real is only contingent, not the inevitable consequence of 'the human con-
dition,'" Hurst replied, "You and I may differ on whether there is some 
reality in a 'human condition' which is likely to pose problems of the con-
trol of organized power in any social system of a sort the world has yet 
known." And when another colleague, Robert Gordon, objected that "Func-
tionalism assumes a main event, a something else called 'society' or 'so-
cial change' that law is functional to" and added that "the something else 
has to be invented by the theorist," Hurst insisted that the law responded 
to "stubborn realities of fact out there in the world of experience."88 
From his students days in the 1930s through the antiwar movement of 
the 1960s and 1970s, Hurst's career spanned what the historians Steve 
Fraser and Gary Gerstle have termed "an epoch in the nation's political 
history," the New Deal order. Of course Hurst's career was atypical in the 
seriousness, intelligence, and independence with which he pursued a func-
tionalist understanding of the Rule of Law applicable to all branches of an 
active state. And yet future research might well show that many lawyers 
of his generation shared his most basic assumptions and did so out of a 
similar attempt to relate their own experiences to the history of their times. 
One thing seems certain. For Hurst the most stubborn realities were two 
from his young adulthood: the privations of the Great Depression and the 
inestimable contributions of the administrative state to the living of "lives 
of good conscience and fulfillment."89 
87. James Willard Hurst, "Thoreau, Conscience and Law," South Dakota Law Review 19 
(1974): 38; Hurst, "Modem American Legal History," cassette 13, side 2; Cozzens, Just and 
the Unjust, 434. For Hurst's recollections of the "self-righteous intolerance" of some of his 
students, see Hurst, Smail Interview, 93-96. 
88. Hurst to Mark V. Tushnet, 15 June 1981, JWH-AFM; Robert W. Gordon to Willard 
Hurst, 15 November 1981, ibid.; Hurst to Gordon, n.d. [19811, ibid. 
89. Gary Gerstle and Steve Fraser, "Introduction," The Rise alld Fall of the New Deal 
Order, ed. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), ix; 
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